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ADDRESS

Simon M. Lorne *

Current Trends in International
Securities Regulation
Ideally, I would like to discuss the international aspects of securities regulation as Americans think of securities regulation and to tie everything
together neatly. However, if there is a way to do that, I haven't discovered
it.
In fact, American securities regulation has evolved over a period of
some sixty years since the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that evolution has taken place
almost entirely in a domestic economy. For many years, America had the
luxury of viewing itself as a large island with big oceans between it and the
nearest country because, for the most part, Canada and Mexico were not
really thought of in this context as foreign countries. As a result, our pattern of securities regulation developed virtually without regard to the
international market.
Today, when we talk about the relationship between U.S. securities
regulation and international securities markets, I think the only realistic
way to do so is to look at the different ways in which American securities
regulation operates and to see how each of those is affected by the international environment. It is perfectly clear today that we can no longer view
ourselves as a self-sufficient island that doesn't need to pay attention to the
rest of the world the way we could-or at least did-twenty, thirty, or fifty
years ago.
For example, we have heard much about abuses involving derivative
financial products and what happens when people and companies engage
* General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private
publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Chairman,
any Commissioner or any other member of the staff of the Commission. 17 C.F.R.
§ 200.735-4(e) (2) (ii) (1995). Additionally, certain matters discussed in this outline may
be issues in litigation in which the Commission appears as a party or otherwise, and no
statement made in this outline should be considered indicative of the views or positions
that might be taken by the Commission in any such litigation. This address was
delivered at Cornell Law School on May 1, 1995.
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in transactions in such derivatives without paying sufficient attention to
what they are doing. We have observed the consequences of carelessness
in a number of areas. One of the most significant recent instances of loss
from derivatives transactions occurred about one and one-half years ago
with Metallgesellschaft, a German operation that had a very significant
effect on a number of American companies.
Not too long ago, I was awakened fairly early in the morning with the
news that a candidate for the office of President of Mexico had been assassinated. We, at the SEC, were in the office that morning monitoring international markets, and considering a request to halt the trading of Mexican
securities in the United States. Ultimately, the markets agreed to a brief
halt to allow that news to settle in so that investors could make informed
decisions.
Most recently, there was the Barings PLC fiasco, which turned out not
to have the enormous consequences that many of us first feared, but
clearly illustrated the growing importance of globalization of the securities
markets.
Every one of the major securities firms today has offices around the
world and trades securities twenty-four hours a day. The flow of capital
doesn't really have much respect for different regulatory regimes. It goes
where the capital can most effectively be employed. Quite often, the
impact of a regulatory regime is to artificially affect the economic decisions that would otherwise be made. I will talk more about that later, but
it is perfectly clear that globalization of the securities markets is upon us.
At a different level, as I speak, we at the SEC are conducting a seminar
for international securities regulators. It is the fifth annual seminar and in
it we bring a number of securities regulators from emerging markets to
the SEC headquarters in Washington, D.C. Our staff members talk to
them for two weeks, eight hours a day, about how we regulate securities
activities in the United States, so that we can help them think about their
own securities regulation regimes.
In an interesting way, the experience with these foreign regulators
poses what I view as the flip side of a question I was asked recentlywhether Barings PLC would have been possible if American securities regulation circled the globe. There is a question that I like to ask when I talk
with regulators from emerging markets (and we think primarily, though
far from exclusively, about Eastern Europe in that regard): if we took
1995 American securities regulation and imposed it on the American
securities markets of 1900, would those markets have been able to develop
the way they did? I believe that people who study American securities regulation would benefit from pondering this question. It is useful for us to
force ourselves away from the chauvinistic mindset that says "what works
for America today is what ought to be everywhere today." That isn't to say
that foreign jurisdictions can't learn from our experience. One hopes
that we can all learn from each other's experience. However, we should
exercise some caution in exporting a fully developed regulatory system to
a marketplace mat is less than fully developed.
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I will now discuss the different threads of American securities regulation and explore how they work in the international environment. The
first is the Enforcement Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been mildly engaged in international activities for a longer
period than any other division of the agency. Its continued international
involvement is due to the existence of questions about the extra-territorial
enforcement of the securities laws. Those questions tend to resemble at
their base the questions that arise when the local police force here in Ithaca chases somebody across state lines. A variety of jurisdictional quesdons arise, to which the answers are sometimes unclear. They are what I
term relatively low intensity questions. We have negotiated with many
other countries, particularly Switzerland, memoranda of understanding
that help the enforcement of one country's laws and procedures in
another, including discovery and information sharing. These memoranda
constitute a relatively low, although quite important, level of international

activity.
Our Investment Management Division is involved in a higher level of
international activity. This division regulates mutual funds and investment
advisors. There is currently a great deal of interest in both American
investment abroad and foreign investment in the American markets.
There are no questions posed if foreigners invest in American markets
through American mutual funds or if foreign mutual funds invest in
American securities. If foreign funds raise capital in the United States,
questions do arise, but they are the same questions that are posed by any
foreign issuer selling shares in our markets and are only slightly different,
for reasons I will address shortly, from the issues facing domestic issuers.
Finally, some questions arise when Americans invest in foreign countries,
through mutual funds that we regulate, simply because the host countries
of the investments may not have the same standards that we have here. In
this regard, one thinks primarily about the clearance and settlement of
securities transactions.
Our regulation of investment companies is fairly intrusive. We regulate them closely because our goal is to ensure that the operations of the
company are handled in a manner that treats investors fairly. Thus, we
need to be involved, and are involved, in the process of how that company
invests, how it holds its securities, and what safeguards it has for its shareholders. This participation requires, for example, consideration of how an
American fund with investments in Russia will hold those Russian investments. We are examining that kind of area and are working with our overseas counterparts to obtain a reasonable accommodation of interests.
Corporation Finance is the division within the SEC that deals with
disclosure obligations, which many people traditionally think of as the primary focus of the SEC. Its involvement with foreign nationals comes on
two fronts. One is the extent to which the overseas offerings must comply
with domestic U.S. disclosure obligations as well as when and to what
extent they are exempt from those requirements. Recently, there has
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been a very interesting development in this area, and it illustrates how the
focus on international activities has become domestically valuable for us.
In order to accommodate the desire of issuers for a greater degree of
certainty with regard to overseas issuances, a few years ago we adopted
Regulation S, which identifies circumstances under which offerings in foreign countries will not be deemed subject to American securities regulation. Regulation S includes limitations on when securities can be brought
back into the United States. Those limitations are designed in large part
to satisfy us, as regulators, that the offering really is a "foreign offering."
What has now developed, however, is a practice of first issuing securities
overseas, principally in Europe, at a significant discount from American
market prices in order to avoid the U.S. registration process, and then
bringing those securities back over here as soon as possible.
The initial response to that sort of activity was that it was an abuse of
Regulation S. Some observers, however, notably including Commissioner
Wallman, perceived a larger question: if it is economically worthwhile for
an American corporation to issue its securities in Europe, even at a significant discount, in order to avoid the registration process, doesn't that tell
us there is something wrong with the registration process itself? Shouldn't
we reexamine the registration process and determine why people are
behaving in this manner and what implications their behavior has for the
process? As we pay more attention to what we are doing internationally,
we find ourselves more compelled to think about what we are doing
domestically and whether our actions are appropriate.
When a country moves a regulatory system into a new environment, it
is forced to go back to basics and think about why the regulatory processes
exist and whether they are performing an important function. This
thought process is a valuable exercise for any agency. At present, the new
Republican majority in Congress seems determined that we undertake
that exercise to a greater degree than some of us might have preferred,
but I would argue that this approach will be beneficial in the long run. In
any event, partially in response to the concerns that Commissioner
Wallman voiced with regard to the Regulation S activities, Chairman Levitt
has now started an advisory committee, chaired by Commissioner
Wallman, addressing the corporation disclosure and capital formation
process. The committee is studying ways to make our processes in this
area more efficient and more responsive.
Another aspect of the Division of Corporation Finance's involvement
in international activities has to do with listings of foreign companies'
securities on U.S. stock exchanges. As the world becomes smaller and
smaller, more and more foreign entities want to tap the American capital
markets. Similarly, many American investors want the opportunity to
invest in foreign companies. The principal question in this context is: to
what extent should American accounting policies apply to foreign corporations that historically have not had to adopt U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles? Our initial reaction was that if we apply accounting principles to American companies because we think they are impor-
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tant to American investors, then those same principles, or substantially
identical principles, ought to be applied to a foreign company that wants
to raise money from American investors. We shouldn't simply be waiving
application of the normal accounting principles because, for example, a
German company isn't used to complying with them. Most of us still
retain this view-what I believe to be the correct view of life. If a German
company, Daimler-Benz for example, wants to list its securities as it did
some two years ago on the New York Stock Exchange, then it needs to
comply substantially with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in
effect in the United States. If it is not willing to do so, then it will not be
allowed to have its securities listed. Although some American money may
get into that company, we will not invite that result.
There is one area in which that view has somewhat changed. Some of
our corporate disclosure requirements embedded in accounting principles may exist not merely to protect investors but also to affect corporate
behavior. A good example is the U.S. requirement in proxy solicitations
that management create a compensation committee which gives a report
about compensation practices. While that proxy statement requirement
was adopted in order to provide shareholders with important disclosures,
it was also adopted to affect the way in which corporate compensation
committees think about executive compensation. The goal was to focus
the committee members' attention and say to them: 'You are going to
have to talk to shareholders about this so you ought to treat it carefully."
To some degree, this kind of thinking has always played a role in the application of our disclosure processes.
To the extent that our disclosure obligations are established in order
to permit the advancement of these corporate governance concerns rather
than to provide disclosure to American investors, one can argue rationally
that those standards should apply to American companies but not necessarily to foreign companies. One could suggest that we have a far stronger
interest in affecting the management behavior of companies subject to
American jurisdiction than we do in trying to affect the behavior of companies outside of our borders.
This point leads me to the most difficult area of all-one which raises
the Barings PLC issue. I refer to the activities of our Division of Market
Regulation. The Division of Corporation Finance is designed to require
disclosure, i.e., to allow companies to do whatever they want, but generally
to require that there be disclosure so that investors may make an informed
decision. The Division of Market Regulation, by contrast, is designed to
regulate directly the securities industry, including both the self-regulatory
organizations, which in this country operate the securities markets, and
participants in securities marketing activities-brokers and dealers in
securities. I want to focus on the regulation of market participants for the
moment because that is the principal area overseen by the Division of Market Regulation that has significant international implications.
We regulate market participants in two principal ways. The first is in
their dealings with customers: Are they following appropriate sales prac-
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tices? Are they making sensible recommendations to customers? Are they
improperly taking advantage of customers? Those issues are not terribly
affected by international considerations. The other area is regulation of
the firm's net capital and financial stability, i.e., regulating how much capital the firm has in place in order to do business and establishing requirements for the measurement of its capital. For example, if a securities firm
owns 100,000 shares of General Motors Common Stock, how does one
value those shares? Is it simply the market price, or is it the market price
less a discount in order to reflect some risk of possible market declines?
In a fairly detailed set of regulations, the SEC establishes how to measure
different holdings and how the relationship of assets and liabilities is to be
measured and maintained by a firm engaged in the securities business.
We have established these requirements in the first instance so that
customers will have the security of knowing they are dealing with a firm
that has real substance. There is, of course, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), which has insurance programs that are in some
respects comparable to the more familiar banking insurance programs,
although far from identical. SIPC provides some elements of safety, but
we have always primarily relied on our capital regulation requirements.
Initially, capital requirements were probably established primarily for
the protection of customers, including counterparties with whom firms
trade. If we are regulating and need to maintain fairness in the markets,
we must make sure that professional market participants can deal with and
rely upon each other. Our capital regulation provides the basis for that
mutual reliance. More and more frequently, however, as some of the
securities firms have become very large, we are confronted with an additional concern that is being addressed by net capital rules. This concern
involves "systemic risk." By that term, we refer to the risk that the failure
of a very large firm might affect other firms, creating a potential domino
effect. Especially during the last few years, with very large securities firms,
we have sensed a need to address that kind of regulatory function-i.e., a
regulatory function that is much more like the traditional regulation exercised by the banking regulators. In addressing this topic, I should first
emphasize that every responsible group that has examined the topic of
systemic risk has concluded that the risk is extremely slight. Nonetheless,
its existence cannot be ignored.
Such an undertaking is extraordinarily difficult for regulators in the
current environment. We regulate domestic securities firms. Those firms
compete domestically in a large number of areas, with banks, with insurance companies, and with hedge funds-partnership pools of money that
are put together for investment purposes in an unregulated environment.
All of those entities, and others, compete among themselves but also with
their foreign counterparts. Each entity has a different regulatory framework. Some have suggested that a degree of regulatory competition is
sometimes desirable, in that it keeps us all honest. It avoids the possibility
that anybody will overregulate. However, I am concerned that such com-
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petition will lead to operating inefficiencies, regulatory inefficiencies, and
a lack of any regulatory control.
In 1994, there were unsuccessful domestic efforts to consolidate banking regulation. There is a very real likelihood that the Glass-Steagall Act
will be substantially reformed by the current Congress, and it may well
permit banks to engage more fully in investment banking activities and
vice versa. We may well receive some greater degree of functional regulation as a part of that reform for which the SEC has been arguing over the
past several years, so that we can regulate securities activities regardless of
who conducts them, and ensure a level playing field that protects customers. We will see how that development unfolds, but the fact remains at
present that the firms whose capital we regulate and find it important to
regulate can very easily move capital out of the regulated entity-out of
the brokerage firm-into an unregulated affiliate and engage in very substantial trading activities, or they can move substantial parts of their operations overseas. London is one possibility as the next home, but it could be
Tokyo, Hong Kong, or anywhere else in the world.
Capital is very mobile in this respect. Thus, when the SEC tries to
regulate the capital position of an American securities firm, the firm considers whether those regulations are interfering with its operations to such
a degree that it should consider moving the regulated operations out of
the entity or out of the jurisdiction entirely. As a result, our options in the
current environment are somewhat limited. However, there is also pressure to design the regulatory processes rationally in order to avoid unnecessary movement of capital. For the most part, we are talking about firms
that accept the notion of regulation because they realize some real benefits from a pattern of regulation that helps to ensure safer markets for all.
We are currently doing two things to address those problems. First,
Chairman Levitt some months ago asked a group of the biggest firms to
assemble the so-called Derivatives Policy Group in order to compile an
analysis of risk management systems that would help us monitor how each
firm is operating outside of our direct regulation. He asked these firms to
act on a voluntary basis. They accepted the invitation and provided the
SEC with their report in April 1995. Pursuant to that report, they are now
commencing the process of sending information to us regarding firm-wide
activities which take place outside the regulated entity over which we have
clear jurisdiction.
I happened to have a conversation with a Managing Director of one
of those firms. He was an active part of the group that put together the
report. When I spoke with him, his firm was in the process of generating
the first actual report to the SEC and he said: 'You know, we hadn't really
thought about it when we were designing the report, but now that we are
rolling up our sleeves and providing the information, that is an extraordinarily useful management tool for us." He found that the firm is better
able to manage its risk exposure and better able to understand areas in
which it is exposed because of the information it is providing to the SEC.
This activity has been fruitful and will likely expand. There is always an
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element of concern when one is dealing with voluntary compliance, but
we should now be better able to track the world-wide activities of the firms.
Second, we are continuing to discuss regulatory matters with our foreign counterparts on a regular basis. I was asked earlier whether the Barings experience could have been avoided with greater international
cooperation. I think if Barings had been following the procedures outlined by the Derivatives Policy Group and paying attention to them, the
debacle probably could and should have been avoided. I can't tell you
that with certainty because it appears that information was available within
Barings that should have indicated the presence of these risks. Would
more information have caused somebody to lift up a hand and say: "Wait
a minute, do we know what is going on over there in Singapore?" I don't
know. Do I think it likely that we will adopt on an international basis
mandatory standards that would require people to avoid that kind of problem? I don't think so. After all, in the United States it wasn't so long ago
that Drexel Burnham Lambert, a very substantial firm, got itself into an
unacceptable liquidity position and failed. It is fairly clear to me that the
Commission paid close attention to that situation but ultimately concluded that the proper answer was to allow the firm to fail. The Commission will allow that to happen if doing so does not unduly jeopardize other
market participants. It will allow the market to operate in a natural manner. One thinks about intervention when one has concerns about broader
systemic risk. We are engaged in activities to try to avoid those risks, and
we will pay attention to them. My best guess is that the information in
Barings would have been more clear if everybody had followed the procedures of the Derivatives Policy Group.. However, some cases like Barings
may happen anyway, and quite possibly they should.
When I began this talk, I said I didn't see any clear way to weave the
threads of the international activities of the SEC into a single, coherent
fabric. Each of our major divisions-the Divisions of Enforcement, Investment Management, Corporation Finance, and Market Regulation, as well
as the Office of General Counsel-is involved in international concerns to
one degree or another. In the global financial world of 1995, we cannot
responsibly avoid a heavy dose of international concern. Each division
addresses different international concerns in its own way. Perhaps that is
not surprising, but it is rather symbolic of the way American enterprises
have entered the international environment over recent decades. Each
enterprise has entered that environment individually, for its own reasons,
to satisfy its own needs. But when viewed in the aggregate, they have created a fully American sector in the international marketplace.

